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Abstract
Taking Michael Walzer’s and Larry May’s reflections on jus post bellum as a point 
of  departure, I  explore here some of  the limits of  what might be called the inherited 
notion of  jus post bellum. I then articulate a broader perspective for jus post bellum, 
influenced by thinking on transitional justice. I argue that, given the nature of  modern 
warfare and the evident shift to wars of  humanitarian intervention, the contemporary 
understanding is no longer limited to restorative ex post justice, but must also include 
forward-looking aims, and for this purpose the discourse of  transitional justice is better 
suited.
Larry May involves Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars to articulate a concep-
tion of  justice at the end of  war which is appropriate to our contemporary situation. 
Taking Walzer’s and May’s observations on these issues as a point of  departure, I will 
here explore some of  the limits of  what might be called the inherited notion of  jus 
post bellum. I will then articulate a broader perspective for jus post bellum, influenced 
by thinking on transitional justice. This perspective, like transitional justice itself, is 
both backward- and forward-looking. By contrast, the inherited notion of  jus post bel-
lum tends to view conflict as the interruption of  a putatively just or stable status quo 
ante, which is to be restored to the fullest extent possible.1 Given the nature of  mod-
ern warfare and the evident shift to wars of  liberal intervention, the contemporary 
understanding is no longer limited to restorative ex post justice, but must also include 
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forward-looking aims, and for this purpose the discourse of  transitional justice is bet-
ter suited.
Wars are being waged within a highly developed set of  constraints under human 
rights and international humanitarian law, as well as expectations of  democratiza-
tion. There is thus an extraordinarily high demand for post bellum justice, whilst the 
guiding principles and values for such remain controversial.
May observes that, in relation to the larger law of  war, the issue of  jus post bellum 
is under-theorized. He notes that ‘Walzer seems to subsume jus post bellum consid-
erations under jus ad bellum’.2 Of  course, this is in and of  itself  a significant norma-
tive statement about the meaning of  jus post bellum: i.e., there are limited post-war 
norms and, moreover, that these are most crucially connected to the principles 
which guide the initiation of  war. Accordingly, the focus in the post bellum here is 
in response to aggressive war. The just aftermath is one that imposes constraints 
following such wars.
May draws from Walzer’s articulation of  the just war tradition the guiding prin-
ciple that there ought to be a thoroughgoing proportionality regarding jus post bellum. 
Moreover, he reasons that such a calculus might well lead to ‘contingent pacifism’.3 
The application of  the principle of  proportionality, he argues, should move us in the 
direction of  trying to avoid war altogether – a utopian direction.
On the 35th anniversary of  Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, there is a 
growing appreciation of  the potential importance of  the area of  the law of  war 
known as jus post bellum. Yet the relationship of  law to conflict today is a complex 
one, and contemporary circumstances hardly reflect May’s utopianism. Rather, 
one might perhaps see the current legal panorama as constituting a new view 
of  peace – in the just war analysis – namely one that moves away from that asso-
ciated with inter-state conflict to a calculus which reconceives a just peace in 
terms of  human security, with implications for a transformed understanding of  the 
meaning and role of  justice during such periods. I have discussed this framework 
at greater length elsewhere.4 Below, I outline some of  the changes in post bellum 
expectations and the ways in which these are best captured by a more comprehen-
sive concept and vocabulary associated with these periods of  political flux: tran-
sitional justice.
1 Just and Unjust Wars – Half  a Century On
To begin, post-conflict justice is, as Walzer himself  would admit, hardly a central 
theme in Just and Unjust Wars. Insofar as he addresses jus post bellum at all, it is through 
the problem of  ‘settlements’, as well as the question of  responsibility, where he brings 
to bear other strands of  the just war tradition, particularly those norms concerning 
the justification of  war at the outset (jus ad bellum). As Walzer subsequently observed 
2 May, ‘Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of  War’, in this issue, at 315.
3 L. May, After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective (2012), at 219 ff.
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in his most recent book, Arguing about War, written after the war in Iraq, jus post bellum 
was not a central concern until after World War II, and more recently with decoloniza-
tion and later transitions.
What is owed to Iraq or to other peoples who are the ‘beneficiaries’ of  wars 
of  supposed liberation?5 This is the burning question of  the last decade in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and most recently Libya. Where a war is justified on humanitarian 
grounds, i.e., a just war, what are the implications of  this justice in the ad bellum 
for jus post bellum? One might well pose the question: What is the relationship of  
jus post bellum to jus ad bellum? On the other hand, might the injustice of  a war’s 
beginning imply greater post-war duties? Or does the logic work the other way 
around? In the event that a war is initiated for humanitarian reasons might that 
well imply added duties, whether during or after the conflict?6 Just how does post-
war justice relate to the broader questions concerning the meaning and direction 
of  the justice of  war? To what extent does the contemporary iteration of  the just 
war tradition, its principles and values, help to guide the question of  what must 
be done following a conflict? In his post-Iraq book, which elaborates upon the just 
war tradition in light of  more recent wars, Walzer poses the problem of  ‘after-
maths’, in particular those following an unjust war. In his words, ‘[j]ust how is 
postwar justice related to the just war tradition’, i.e., the justice of  the war itself  
and the conduct of  its battles?7
2 Getting Beyond the Restoration of  the Status Quo Ante
With the end of  the Cold War we have seen a return to wars of  intervention, 
with implications for the scope and character of  jus post bellum. There is a need to 
rethink the earlier classical approach to post-war justice as being fundamentally 
restora tive. Posing the question today of  what values and related principles regard-
ing rights and duties should apply, post bellum inevitably constitutes a departure 
from a focus on restoration (which takes implicitly or explicitly the pre-war status 
quo as a decisive normative benchmark). Historically, this area was dominated by 
a preoccupation with unjust wars and the settlements that followed those wars, 
focusing on restraining or regulating the punishment of  the aggressor for disrupt-
ing the status quo ante.
In this context, victors were free to punish, within determined constraints – limits 
on collective punishment, spoils of  war, plunder, return of  prisoners of  war, occupied 
territory, etc. This was often complemented by amnesties and reparation schemes 
animated by restorative objectives. The post-World War I settlement at Versailles was 
widely regarded as an instance of  failed justice and, even worse, as having the effect of  
promoting the return of  war.8
5 See N. Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of  Nation Building (2004).
6 See Teitel, ‘The Wages of  Just War’, 39 Cornell Int’l LJ (2006) 689.
7 M. Walzer, Arguing About War (2004), at 164.
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For Walzer, even enemy nations guilty of  aggression have a right to their contin-
ued existence.9 Building on Walzer,10 May offers proportionality as a ‘metanorm’.11 
One could conceive this view of  post bellum in historical or retrospective terms – 
where what is at stake is responsibility in a backward-looking way, as guided by the 
justice of  the war purpose itself  and the goal of  returning to the pre bellum or status 
quo ante.
Now, however, we can see that we are moving away from this traditional approach to 
jus post bellum in a number of  ways: first, there is a move away from the dominant con-
cern of  jus post bellum conceived as a backward-looking enterprise, and as restraint, to 
a broader framework involving a host of  duties that relate not just to the past but also 
to an often protracted present, as well as forward-looking goals for a peaceful future. 
The aegis or subject of  post bellum norms has become greatly expanded.
Many questions today concerning what obligations attend aftermaths are being 
raised in the context of  transition, sometimes following conflict, but just as often not. 
For a number of  reasons, this view increasingly overlaps with conflict. At a time of  per-
sistent smaller conflicts, i.e., of  pervasive violence, often of  ongoing internal conflicts 
where there is no clear end,12 and which are not even clearly about state-building or 
democratization, this inquiry leads to a questioning of  the meaning of  ‘post bellum’ in 
jus post bellum. As May concedes, the parameters of  post bellum have become murky.13
Along similar lines, there has been a shift in our understanding of  responsibility 
away from the state-centric view as the singularly relevant subject of  jus post bellum, 
as the older view of  restoration assumed the state to be the relevant object of  restora-
tion. At the same time, there has been a move away from collective sanctions levied 
upon a state or its people. Individualized punishment is clearly on the rise, most dra-
matically through international criminal justice.14
3 Towards an Alternative Paradigm: What Normative 
Framework Should Apply?
In the current context, justice considerations enter the picture from the outset, con-
sider that humanitarian considerations have been invoked as a justification for war 
itself. In today’s wars of  liberation internal ethnic conflicts are often involved; the issue 
is as much or more to do with settling scores with fellow citizens as punishing a foreign 
aggressor. Clearly, this brings transitional justice to the fore.
9 See Walzer, supra note 1, at 123.
10 See Walzer, supra note 1, at 119–120.
11 See May, supra note 3, at 6.
12 On the new wars see M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (2nd edn, 2007).
13 See May, supra note 3, at 2–3.
14 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (ICTY, 7 May 1997). The recent ICJ 
rulings in Bosnia v. Serbia and Jurisdictional Immunities of  the State (Germany v. Italy, Greece intervening) 
Judgment, 3 Feb. 2012, available at: www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf  can be viewed as set-
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Insofar as the new wars are often conflicts animated by the values of  liberalization, 
freedom, and so on, we can see ways in which the aegis of  jus post bellum overlaps 
with the aims of  transitional justice. Justice is not conceived as strictly punishment 
oriented, as assumed in the legalist paradigm. Nor is it confined to restitution and 
the restorative dimension implied by the earlier understanding of  post-war justice. 
Indeed, it could well take in the full context and modalities of  transition and transfor-
mation. The issue is being reconceived in terms of  justice as security. Within the evolv-
ing framework, there is a concern to identify responsibility beyond the state to private 
actors as well. There are duties that follow even when a war is just.
Thus, ‘post bellum’ seems too limited or inappropriate today because of  the unsta-
ble or undetermined boundaries between conflict and post-conflict situations.15 
Transitional justice is arguably more capacious because it allows for purposes beyond 
those associated with a war’s beginning, such as transformation, namely purposes 
going beyond retributive or restorative justice.
Rethinking the regulation of  conflict in contemporary circumstances entails the 
challenge of  integrating and recalibrating the norms that were shaped traditionally by 
their strict association or co-relation with a defined point in the course of  the conflict 
– ad bellum, in bello, post bellum. Today we see that international humanitarian law or 
jus in bello applies during armed conflict and beyond. At least one tribunal has declared 
that it extends beyond this point.16 While jus ad bellum was generally seen to relate to 
the beginning of  conflict, and therefore to guide questions of  the legitimacy of  the use 
of  force in international law, today we can see that the traditional inquiry regarding 
aggression has given way to a broader inquiry regarding the treatment of  civilians, 
human security, etc. Moreover, the question of  jus ad bellum – whether a war is unjust 
or just – evidently has ramifications for the duties of  justice in the aftermath.
With the complexity of  the new phenomena, one can see that multiple legal orders are 
arguably applicable in guiding the law of  war, including post bellum and in bello, i.e., interna-
tional humanitarian law, as well as occupation law and human rights law. This implies spe-
cific requirements associated with each of  these areas, for instance, jus in bello, or the norms 
regarding the treatment of  prisoners and other non-combatants set out in the Geneva 
Conventions. Occupation law, too, is generally the guiding principle for the protection of  
the status quo in occupied territories.17 Lastly, human rights law, while generally associated 
with the guarantees a state gives its citizens in peacetime, also now applies in situations of  
conflict along with the law of  war.18 Other specific guarantees in certain situations may be 
in tension with one another.19 To what extent are there broader guiding values?
15 See UN Development Programme, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, at 
2–8 (discussing the ‘challenge of  repeated cycles of  violence’). See I. Rangelov and M. Theros, Field Notes 
from Afghanistan: Perceptions of  Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics, LSE Global Governance, Working Paper 
No. WP 01/2010, Apr. 2010.
16 See Prosecutor v.  Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, at para. 69 (ICTY, 2 Oct. 1995).
17 See Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli, ‘Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, 
23 Berkeley J Int’l L (2005) 551.
18 See App. No. 57950/00, Isayeva v. Russia, 41 ECHR (2005) 38.
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For Walzer, ‘[d]emocratic political theory … provides the central principles of  the 
account’.20 Yet one is inclined to suggest that the values ultimately underpinning 
Walzer’s proposal are broader, namely those of  human protection and security. He 
thus elaborates, ‘What determines the overall justice of  a military occupation is less 
its planning or its length than its political direction and the distribution of  the ben-
efits it provides.’21 The question becomes: To what extent are people’s lives improved? 
Consider in this regard the significance of  various measures such as de-baathification 
(in Iraq) and the equal treatment of  various groups, which involve commitments 
beyond pure or simple democracy.
I employed the term ‘transitional justice’ in 1991 to represent a move away from the 
discourse that associated such phenomena purely with the law of  conflict.22 The idea was 
that the aims of  such processes were in part forward-looking – involving democratiza-
tion – and not backward-looking and associated with war. Moreover, the use of  the term 
‘transitional justice’ also addressed the central issue of  the time: the extent to which the 
relevant democratization processes seemed less revolutionary and more gradual, more 
transitional, often taking decades, for example in post-dirty war Latin America. We now 
have a rich set of  illustrations from the post-Soviet bloc, Asia, and the Middle East.
4 The Peace v. Justice Debate
By contrast, it is in the dynamic contemporary context that questions of  conflict-
related justice are being confronted today; namely, situations in which conflict has 
not completely ceased and where there are multiple actors and aims. Let us return 
now to May’s proposal that the post bellum context be guided by the principle of  pro-
portionality.23 What does it mean to apply the principle of  proportionality in jus post 
bellum? Today this question has gained in traction. Applying the proportionality prin-
ciple requires thinking through the likely effects of  jus post bellum strategies in periods 
of  substantial flux. What is the likely impact of  criminal justice on the consolidation of  
human rights protection in a given society? The first rule is that it should do no harm: 
‘[w]hatever is required by the application of  other jus post bellum principles must not 
impose more harm on the peoples of  the world than is alleviated by the application of  
these principles’.24
The respective roles of  trials and amnesties in the transition from war to peace have 
been examined by political scientists within an instrumentalist framework that under-
stands proportionality in terms of  trade-offs. For Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri,25 
the inquiry regarding proportionality is essentially about the extent to which justice 
20 See Walzer, supra note 7, at 164.
21 Ibid., at 165.
22 See Luban, ‘Reviewing John Ester, Closing the Books. Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective 
(2004)’, 116 Ethics (2006) 409; and R. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000).
23 May, supra note 2, at 324–325.
24 See May, supra note 3, at 14.
25 See Snyder and Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of  International 
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advances or undermines peace, where the critical variable or objective is peace; mar-
shalling for the primacy of  peace considerations over justice.26 Some analysts are sim-
ply sceptical about criminal trials, and see them as threatening the objective of  peace, 
while Leigh Payne, based on an empirical study of  transitional justice outcomes in 
a wide range of  situations, views a mix or balance of  trials, truth commissions, and 
amnesties as more likely to produce outcomes supportive of  the rule of  law and peace-
ful democratic transition.27
5 Jus post bellum as Transitional Justice
The increasingly pervasive involvement of  courts and tribunals in matters of  post- 
conflict justice demands a conception of  proportionality that is not simply political but 
also jurisprudential. This is far from being limited to criminal trials. One also thinks 
of  Alien Torts Claims actions in the United States and the role of  the Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights and the European Court of  Human Rights in post-conflict 
accountability. We can see that justice has gone from a prerogative of  the victor, which 
needs restraining, to a shared international obligation. This development in and of  
itself  informs the meaning of  the new proportionality.
The constitutive instruments of  the ad hoc criminal tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court reflect this change. Their preambles assert that their purpose includes 
guarding the peace. Meanwhile they also function in a more traditional way, offering 
constraints on victors’ justice – because the many rules as to the scope and jurisdic-
tion of  tribunals and offences are fixed – thereby defining the very parameters of  the 
offence. Through these tribunals we have moved away from traditional post-war judg-
ments which were expressly disconnected from the end of  war, and away from the 
focus on the accountability of  any one state, i.e, the victor. This was made very clear 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, as it was established 
during wartime and contemplated prosecution of  actors on all sides of  the conflict, 
with evenhandedness with respect to nationality and ethnicity.28 This move depoliti-
cizes and entrenches a timeless approach to jus post bellum. The response is punitive, 
but the punishment is individualized not collective. This is the fundamental challenge 
of  jus post bellum as criminal justice: How can individualized punishment address the 
systematic wrongs of  war waged between collectivities?
Increasingly, the normative regime pertaining to war is also peace-related. It has 
become heavily regulated by a new area of  law – international criminal law – and 
institutionalized via the new tribunals. The ad hoc criminal tribunals, beginning with 
the ICTY, were instituted to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’,29 
26 Ibid.
27 T.D. Olsen, L.A. Payne and A.G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing 
Efficacy (2010).
28 See ICTY, Office of  the Prosecutor, press release, 25 July 1995, at 3; see also ‘Statement by Justice Richard 
Goldstone’, 24 Apr. 1995.
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i.e., to manage war. The tribunals were intended to operate – and did operate – during 
the course of  the conflict, but with a view to facilitating its end. Here the controversy 
is not about victor’s justice but about justice being imposed by the ‘international com-
munity’ on the region. The approach of  the tribunals, reflected in the purposes stated 
in their constitutive instruments, suggests that there are no tragic choices or trade-offs 
between peace and justice, but only positive synergies. There is thus clearly a tension 
between this legal project of  international criminal accountability and the perspective 
of  pragmatic peace-building in the work of  the political scientists discussed above.
6 Conclusion
There is a new relationship between the three strands of  the law of  war. The justifi-
cation for war, especially where humanitarian justice considerations are prominent, 
sets the stage for higher expectations of  humanitarianism, both in relation to how 
war is waged and the responsibilities of  the victors post-conflict. If  one understands 
humanitarianism in terms of  the demand or aspiration for human security, then there 
is indeed a potential to evolve a notion of  proportionality that navigates, so to speak, 
between the legalist and pragmatist perspectives. Going to war for the purposes of  
countering or preventing violations of  humanitarian norms is normatively incoher-
ent from both of  these perspectives if  the ultimate result is a reduction rather than an 
increase in human security, either because of  the inherent impossibility of  achieving 
the humanitarian goals through methods that themselves are adequately respectful of  
humanitarian norms or because of  the exorbitant costs of  establishing human secu-
rity in the post-conflict environment (for instance, Iraq). This notion of  proportional-
ity demands a consonance of  purposes, means, and consequences that straddles jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum.
With renewed demands for military intervention, interest in post bellum justice has 
never been greater. Given the human rights revolution, interventions are both justi-
fied on human security grounds but also waged in the context of  new constraints, of  
human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as expectations of  demo-
cratization. This goes some way to explaining the extraordinarily high demands for 
post bellum justice, which has now transcended its earlier limits to cover a larger period 
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